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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
SECTION 22 OF THE LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT: When Is An
Award Not An Award?
Strachan Shipping Co. v. Hollis1
The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
2
was enacted in 1927 "to give longshoremen a national workmen's com-
pensation law to supply the void (in that respect) by decisions of the
Supreme Court that longshoremen, because exclusively within ad-
miralty jurisdiction, could not come within state compensation laws."'
The statute is remedial in nature4 and its dominant purpose is to bene-
fit longshoremen.5
In construing the Act courts have repeatedly stated that it "should
be liberally construed in favor of the employee, and every provision of
the Act must be given effect to consistently attain the particular pur-
pose of this remedial legislation." Above and beyond this general
policy of liberal construction in favor of the employee, the courts have
also held that any doubts as to interpretation are to be resolved in favor
of the employee.7 These rulings recognize the basic premise that the
Act was intended to benefit longshoremen, by requiring that where
there are two or more equally possible interpretations it will be as-
sumed that Congress intended that interpretation which supports the
fundamental humanitarian purpose of the Act.
1. 460 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1972), aff'g 323 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Tex. 1970),
cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3188 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1972), rehearing denied, 41 U.S.L.W.
3254 (U.S. Nov. 7, 1972).
2. Act of March 4, 1927, ch. 509, §§ 1 et seq., 44 Stat. 1424 (codified at 33
U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter all citations are to the codified sections].
3. Bassett v. Massman Constr. Co., 120 F.2d 230, 233 (8th Cir. 1941). See
generally Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
4. DeWald v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 71 F.2d 810 (4th Cir. 1934); Gibson v.
Hughes, 192 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
5. Reed v. S.S. Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 415 (1963) ; Ruggiero v. Rederiet for M/S
Marion, 308 F. Supp. 798, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also S. REP. No. 973, 69th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1926) ; H.R. REP. No. 1190, 69th Cong., Ist Sess. (1926).
6. Hilicone S.S. Co. v. Pillsbury, 55 F. Supp. 916, 917 (S.D. Cal. 1944), aff'd,
147 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1945). Accord, Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328 (1953) ; Pillsbury
v. United Eng'r Co., 342 U.S. 197 (1952) ; Nalco Chem. Corp. v. Shea, 419 F.2d 572
(5th Cir. 1969); Watson v. Gulf Stevedore Corp., 400 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); McClendon v. Charente S.S. Co., 348 F.2d 298
(5th Cir. 1965).
7. Vinson v. Einbinder, 307 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
934 (1963); Friend v. Britton, 220 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
836 (1955).
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Despite these general rules of construction, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently resolved an ambiguity
in the Act against an injured claimant in Strachan Shipping Co. v.
Hollis.' There the claimant was injured in 1956 in the course of his
employment as a longshoreman. His employer reported the injury
to the Department of Labor Deputy Commissioner, and the insurer
began voluntary payment of compensation. A month later the insurer
stopped voluntary payments but did not contest liability. The claim-
ant then sent a letter to the Deputy Commissioner making claim for
the resumption of payments. Although this was not a formal claim, the
Deputy Commissioner accepted the letter as a claim, and gave notice
to the insurer and the claimant that a pre-hearing conference was to be
set. A series of pre-hearing conferences followed and after the fifth
such conference the claims examiner reported that the parties had
agreed on the amount of compensation payable, and recommended that
the insurer make further voluntary payments in the agreed amount.
In September 1957 the insurer notified the Department of Labor that
it had paid the recommended amount and had stopped further payment.
Medical care, provided by the employer and not affected by the
compensation determination, continued off and on for almost ten years.
When the employer then refused further medical care the first and only
formal hearing was held before a Deputy Commissioner in 1970. At
this time counsel for the insurer and the employer asserted two de-
fenses: first, that the claimant's letter of 1956 did not constitute a
claim; and second, that even if it did constitute a claim, the examiner's
memo following the pre-hearing conference in 1957 fully adjudicated
it and triggered the one year limitation period of section 22.' The
Deputy Commissioner held that the letter constituted a sufficient in-
formal claim under section 13(a)' ° of the Act and that the claims ex-
8. 460 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3188 (U.S. Oct.
10, 1972), rehearing denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Nov. 7, 1972).
9. 33 U.S.C. § 922 (1970). This section states in part:
Upon his own initiative, or upon the application of any party in interest, on the
ground of a change in conditions or because of a mistake in a determination of
fact by the deputy commissioner, the deputy commissioner, may at any time
prior to one year after the date of the last payment of compensation, whether or
not a compensation order has been issued, or at any time prior to one year after
the rejection of a claim, review a compensation case in accordance with the
procedure prescribed in respect of claims in Section 919 of this title, and in
accordance with such section issue a new compensation order which may termi-
nate, continue, reinstate, increase, or decrease such compensation, or award
compensation. ...
10. 33 U.S.C. § 913(a) (1970), which states:
The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless
a claim therefor is filed within one year after the injury, and the right to corn-
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aminer's recommendation did not affect the status of the pending claim,
which was not fully adjudicated in the absence of a compensation order.
He then awarded the claimant further compensation.
In the appeal to the district court that followed," the court agreed
that the letter constituted an adequate claim and that the claims ex-
aminer's memo was not a "compensation order." The court held, how-
ever, that the voluntary payments of September 1957 still constituted
a "last payment" within the meaning of section 22 of the Act,12 thereby
barring the award which resulted from the formal hearing.
A divided three judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court decision. It found that
the Department of Labor handled large numbers of compensation claims
in the same way as it handled the claim in Strachan, that is, by en-
couraging voluntary payments and not disposing of complaints by final
orders. The court spoke of the Commissioner's failure to terminate 8
cases and of the Department of Labor's apparent belief that the time
limitations prescribed by Congress were too short. In its discussion it
stressed the legislative intent in the Act to encourage voluntary pay-
ments and to discourage the utilization of formal adjudicatory pro-
ceedings. Thus, in the opinion of the court, it would be inequitable
to encourage voluntary payments on the one hand while approving the
Deputy Commissioner's refusal to terminate cases by means of a com-
pensation order where voluntary payments are made. The court re-
jected arguments by the Deputy Commissioner and the claimant that
such a decision was in conflict with the prohibitions on waiver and
release by claimants stated in sections 15(b) and 16 of the Act.' 4
A dissent criticized this decision as setting aside "the agency in-
terpretation of forty years."' 5 In the view of the dissent, a longshore-
pensation for death shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within one
year after the death, except that if payment of compensation has been made
without an award on account of such injury or death a claim may be filed within
one year after the date of the last payment. Such claim shall be filed with the
deputy commissioner in the compensation district in which such injury or such
death occurred.
11. Strachan Shipping Co. v. Hollis, 323 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
12. 33 U.S.C. § 922 (1970).
13. 460 F.2d at 1115.
14. 33 U.S.C. § 915(b) (1970) states: "No agreement by an employee to waive
his right to compensation under this chapter shall be valid."
33 U.S.C. § 916 (1970) states:
No assignment, release, or commutation of compensation or benefits due or pay-
able under this chapter, except as provided by this chapter, shall be valid, and
such compensation and benefits shall be exempt from all claims of creditors and
from levy, execution, and attachment or other remedy for recovery or collection
of a debt, which exemption may not be waived.
15. 460 F.2d at 1117 (Ainsworth, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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man's timely filed claim under the Act remains pending until a final
determination by a Deputy Commissioner under section 19(a),"e and
the provisions of section 22 precluding modification of awards not ap-
plied for within one year of the last payment apply only to cases where
such a determination has been made by a Deputy Commissioner. Since
no such determination had been made in this case, according to the
dissent the limitation should not apply.
The essential issue in this case is the interpretation to be given
under these circumstances to the clause in section 22 which states that
modification of an award is precluded later than one year after the
last payment "whether or not a compensation order has been issued."
Since Strachan represents the first judicial attempt to interpret this
clause in such a situation, it is necessary to look to how the rest of the
Act, particularly related sections, have been interpreted, so that each
portion of the Act may be construed in connection with the whole in
order to harmonize its terms. 17
Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit based their decisions
on the assumption that the 1970 order by the Deputy Commissioner
was a modification within the meaning of section 22 of the Act, subject
to that section's one year limitation. Their discussion therefore was
concerned chiefly with whether or not the insurer's last voluntary pay-
ment was a "last payment" within the meaning of the section.
This note will discuss first the validity of that assumption, that is,
the issue of whether a claim remains pending until adjudicated by a
Deputy Commissioner in compliance with section 19 of the Act,"8 or
16. 33 U.S.C. § 919(a) (1970), which states:
Subject to the provisions of section 913 of this title a claim for compensation may
be filed with the deputy commissioner in accordance with regulations prescribed
by the Secretary at any time after the first seven days of disability following
any injury or at any time after death, and the deputy commissioner shall have
full power and authority to hear and determine all questions in respect of
such claim.
17. International Mercantile Marine Co. v. Lowe, 93 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 304 U.S. 565 (1938); Adreance v. Lorentzen, 60 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Sup. Ct.,
Special T., Queens Cty. 1946).
18. 33 U.S.C. § 919 (1970) states in part:
(b) Within ten days after such claim is filed the deputy commissioner in accord-
ance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary, shall notify the employer and
any other person (other than the claimant) whom the deputy commissioner con-
siders an interested party, that a claim has been filed. Such notice may be served
personally upon the employer or other person, or sent to such employer or person
by registered mail.
(c) The deputy commissioner shall make or cause to be made such investigations
as he considers necessary in respect of the claim, and upon application of any
interested party shall order a hearing thereon. If a hearing on such claim is
1973]
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whether it is fully adjudicated when payment is made voluntarily in
accordance with a pre-hearing conference. If the former is true, then
the award by the Deputy Commissioner in 1970 was merely a final
adjudication, not a modification, and therefore not subject to section
22; if the latter is true then section 22 might apply. Secondly, the note
will discuss whether, if section 22 does apply, the last voluntary pay-
ment was a "last payment" within the meaning of that section.
I.
It has previously been held that a claim under the Act, once filed,
remains pending until fully adjudicated by the Deputy Commissioner.
In Lumber Mutual Casualty Co. of New York v. Locke 9 the claim-
ant had received voluntary compensation payments for six months fol-
lowing an injury in October of 1927. Two months after the last
voluntary payment, in June of 1928, he presented a claim for compen-
sation. In September of 1928, following a conference with a claims
examiner from the office of the Deputy Commissioner, he received a
voluntary payment in "full settlement." After this payment the claims
examiner notified both the claimant and insurer that the case had been
closed "within the limitations provided by section 22 of the Act."2
The claimant appeared before the Deputy Commissioner again in Janu-
ary of 1930 and was awarded further compensation. On appeal brought
by the employer the Second Circuit affirmed and held that upon the filing
of a claim the Deputy Commissioner had a duty to make an investigation
and order a hearing if such action was requested by either party. If no
hearing was ordered then the Deputy Commissioner was required to re-
ordered the deputy commissioner shall give the claimant and other interested
parties at least ten days' notice of such hearing, served personally upon the
claimant and other interested parties or sent to such claimant and other interested
parties by registered mail, and shall within twenty days after such hearing is had,
by order, reject the claim or make an award in respect of the claim. If no hearing
is ordered within twenty days after notice is given as provided in subdivision (b)
of this section, the deputy commissioner shall, by order, reject the claim or make
an award in respect of the claim.
(e) The order rejecting the claim or making the award (referred to in this
chapter as a compensation order) shall be filed in the office of the deputy com-
missioner, and a copy thereof shall be sent by registered mail or by certified mail
to the claimant and to the employer at the last known address of each.
19. 60 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1932).
20. Act of March 4, 1927, ch. 509, § 22, 44 Stat. (vol. 2) 1437, was the provision
in effect at the time of Locke and barred review of an order except within the term
of the award and after the compensation order in respect of such award had
become final.
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ject the claim or make an award as provided in section 19(c) of the
Act. 2
1
According to the court it was clear that the Commissioner had
made no award at the time the claims examiner arranged for the settle-
ment payment by the carrier. "Not only had Willard no power to make
an award, which only the Deputy Commissioner could make, but no ac-
cord and satisfaction between the parties was lawful when [sic] once the
jurisdiction of the Commissioner had been invoked and the claim was
pending before him."'
The facts in Locke are strikingly similar to those in Strachan. In
both cases claims were filed following the cessation of voluntary pay-
ments, informal conferences were held resulting in further payments
and additional compensation was later awarded by the Deputy Com-
missioner at a formal hearing. The difference between the two cases
is that the time limitation provided in the earlier version of section 22
was more severe than the version in Strachan, and barred review if not
applied for "during the term of [the] award."23 According to the
Locke court, since no order of a Deputy Commissioner was ever filed
his action was not a review, but was instead the final adjudication of
the original claim and thus not within section 22. The district court
in Strachan was aware of Locke but stated that it did not teach that
"a claim, informally disposed of with the Bureau's blessing, survives
indefinitely. ' 24 Locke does hold, however, that even though some pay-
ment is made as a result of an informal conference, a claim, once filed,
remains pending before the Deputy Commissioner until fully adjudi-
cated with an award. How indefinite its survival is should depend on
the actions of the Deputy Commissioner, not those of the employer
paying compensation.
Four years after the Locke decision, the Third Circuit, in Ameri-
can Mutual Liability Insurance Co. of Boston v. Lowe,25 reiterated
the policy of Locke that a claim is not fully adjudicated in the absence
of a final order complying with the statutory requirements of sections
19 and 21 (a) of the Act.26 The Lowe decision goes even further than
21. 33 U.S.C. § 919(c) (1970).
22. 60 F2d at 37.
23. See note 20 supra.
24. 323 F. Supp. at 1125.
25. 85 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1936).
26. 33 U.S.C. §§ 919, 92 1(a) (1970). Section 921(a) states:
A compensation order shall become effective when filed in the office of the deputy
commissioner as provided in Section 919 of this title, and, unless proceedings for
the suspension or setting aside of such order are instituted as provided in sub-
division (b) of this section, shall become final at the expiration of the thirtieth
day thereafter.
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the position advocated by the claimant and the Deputy Commissioner
in Strachan on the question of how long a claim remains pending.
There a formal hearing before the Deputy Commissioner was held,
resulting in a memo recommending further payment. More than two
years later the claimant applied for further compensation and a formal
compensation order was issued. This formal order was upheld by the
court on the ground that the memo resulting from the first formal
hearing was not a compensation order because it did not meet the
statutory requirements of section 19(e).2 If the memo of a formal
hearing in Lowe was not a final adjudication then it is difficult to see
how the memo of an informal conference in the present case could be a
final adjudication.
The district court in Strachan dismissed Lowe, saying that the
court there indicated that if the 1934 amendment to section 22,2" which
inserted the one year period of limitations in place of the "term of the
award" period, had been applied retroactively, then a different result
would have been reached. 29 Lowe was decided after the 1934 amend-
ment but filed before it was enacted. However, the district court in
Strachan failed to note that the Lowe opinion implied that had the
amendment been in force, a different result would be reached only "if
we assume that the memorandum of May 3, 1932 was a final order."3
The court in Lowe had already found that the memorandum was not
a final order, and thus the amended limitation discussion has no bear-
ing on the substantive finding that in the absence of an order the claim
is still open.
That a claim remains pending absent a final order was reaffirmed
in Candado Stevedoring Corp. v. Willard."1 There the employer had
made some voluntary payments to the employee under the Act. In
1940 the Deputy Commissioner entered an order awarding compen-
sation to the employee "until disability shall have ceased or until other-
wise ordered."'32 In 1944 the employer discontinued payment on the
grounds that the claimant no longer suffered from the disability. The
next month the employee filed a claim for further compensation, but
an order awarding that compensation was not filed until 1949, five
27. 33 U.S.C. § 919(e) (1970).
28. Act of May 26, 1934, ch. 354, § 5, 48 Stat. 807.
29. 323 F. Supp. at 1125. The Lowe court stated that: "[T]he statute as amended
gives no indication that it was to have a retroactive effect. Therefore it should not
be so interpreted." American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Lowe, 85 F.2d 625, 627
(3d Cir. 1936).
30. 85 F.2d at 627.
31. 91 F. Supp. 77 (E.D.N.Y. 1950).
32. Id. at 78.
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years later. In upholding the Commissioner's action the court held that
".. . the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner to review this case
arose on the filing of the claim, and that such jurisdiction remained
unaffected by the delay in holding hearings and making an award. '8 3
This policy has also been followed in recent lower court cases
which have dealt with the Deputy Commissioner's duty to act within
a reasonable time after he has a claim filed before him34 and the re-
quirement that he hold hearings and make final adjudications. 5 It is
clear, therefore, that if the Strachan decision is distinguishable from
these cases, the pre-hearing conference is the element which provides
that distinction.
II.
Pre-hearing conferences are provided for by an administrative
regulation issued under the Act. 6  That regulation states expressly
that a recommendation made by the person in charge of the conference
"is not a 'decision' in the case and will not affect or prejudice the rights
of any party or the further adjustment of the case, should the recom-
mendation not be accepted by such parties and a later hearing be found
necessary. '3 7 In Fenney v. Willard38 the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia adopted these very words in defining the
nature of a pre-hearing conference. Though the facts in Fenney v.
Willard are different from those of Strachan, one of the issues involved
was whether or not a pre-hearing conference was a "hearing" within
the meaning of the Act. The court held there that such a conference
was not a "hearing" since the claims examiner who presided had no
authority to make an award and, "[o]nly the Deputy Commissioner
may make a determination of the claim."3 0
33. Id. at 80.
34. Nix v. O'Keefe, 255 F. Supp. 752 (N.D. Fla. 1966).
35. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Donovan, 274 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1960).
36. 20 C.F.R. § 31.8 (1972).
37. Id.
38. 129 F. Supp. 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). In this case a claim was rejected on the
basis of the fact that it had not been filed within one year of injury. Under 33 U.S.C.
§ 913(b) (1970) such a failure to file in time is not a bar unless objection is made
on those grounds at the first hearing. In Feeney there was a pre-hearing conference
and no objection was raised to the late filing until the first formal hearing. The
claimant argued that the objection should have been raised at this pre-hearing
conference.
39. 129 F. Supp. at 417. Earlier in the opinion, in deciding whether the pre-
hearing conference should be considered a hearing, the court had said:
The purpose of a hearing is to decide whether the claim should be rejected or
an award made based upon it. The purpose of a prehearing conference is to
dispose of controversies amicably where possible, to narrow issues and to
simplify the subsequent methods of proof. While it is called upon notice, it
19731
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It thus appears from the regulations promulgated under the Act
that a pre-hearing conference has no effect on the status of the claim,
and that, in light of the cases discussed previously, the claim remains
pending until a determination is made by the Deputy Commissioner.
In fact, this is the manner in which the Department of Labor has in-
terpreted and administered the Act for nearly forty years. According
to a letter written by the Assistant Director of the Office of Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation:
Section 31.8 prescribes the procedure for pre-hearing agreements
of the parties leading either to informal adjudications under § 01.11
of the Regulations and § 19(c) of the Act, or to interlocutory
agreements upon recommendations which lead to voluntary pay-
ments by the carrier for a certain period without any such "in-
formal adjudication," thus leaving the matter for later determi-
nation by the deputy commission under § 19 of the Act. To pre-
vent any misunderstanding, § 31.15 of the Regulations expressly
prescribes that "during the pendency of a compensation case"
formal orders shall not be made "with respect to interlocutory
matters" in the course of proceedings on a claim and § 31.8
further prescribes that the parties should be told that such agree-
ments, although recommended, cannot be determinations or de-
cisions of the deputy commissioner as required by § 19 of the
Act.40
Thus the words of the regulation and the application of those words
by both the judiciary and the administrative authorities point to one
conclusion - that a pre-hearing conference has no effect on the pend-
ency of a claim.
If the pre-hearing conference did not terminate the pendency of
the claim in Strachan, then the only basis for concluding that it was
no longer pending at the time of the 1970 award would be the proposi-
tion that the claimant's acceptance of the examiner's recommendations
and the resulting payments constituted a settlement of the claim and a
waiver of the right to any further compensation. Such an argument
must be kept informal and not stenographically reported. The person in charge
of the conference prepares, at its conclusion, a memorandum setting forth the
results achieved, and he may make recommendations to the parties for the dis-
position of the controversy, but his recommendations do not amount to a decision
and they will not affect or prejudice the rights of any party or the further
adjustment of the case if they are not accepted.
129 F. Supp. at 416.
40. Letter from John E. Stocker, Assistant Director, Office of Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation to Leavenworth Colby, Special Assistant to the
Attorney General, Aug. 6, 1971, as quoted in Strachan Shipping Co. v. Hollis, 460
F.2d 1108, 1118 (5th Cir. 1972) (appendix to dissenting opinion).
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is weak in light of sections 15(b) and 16 of the Act,41 which expressly
prohibit any waiver or release by an employee of his right to compen-
sation. Both the Locke ' and Lowe43 cases discussed this issue of
waiver as well as the issue of pendency. In Locke the claimant had
received a voluntary payment in "full settlement" following a pre-hear-
ing conference. The court held that under sections 15 (b) and 16, no
accord and satisfaction between the parties was lawful once the juris-
diction of the Commissioner had been invoked and the claim was pend-
ing before him.44
Agreed settlements are allowed in some cases notwithstanding
sections 15(b) and 16, where the Deputy Commissioner determines
that such a settlement is in the best interests of an injured employee
entitled to compensation.45 The procedures for this type of settlement,
however, require that application be made in writing to the Deputy
Commissioner." If he determines that the proposed settlement is in
the employee's best interests he must then send the proposal and a
complete file of the case to the Bureau of Employee's Compensation
with his detailed recommendations. 4  This procedure was not followed
in Strachan; thus no argument can be made that the parties reached
an agreed settlement under the Act .4
In Lowe,49 the contention was made that the memorandum issued
following a hearing by the Deputy Commissioner was formal approval
41. 33 U.S.C. §§ 915(b), 916 (1970).
42. 60 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1932).
43. 85 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1936).
44. 60 F.2d at 37.
45. 33 U.S.C. § 908(i) (1970); 20 C.F.R. § 31.26 (1972).
46. 20 C.F.R. § 31.26(b) (1972) states:
Application for approval of an agreed settlement under section 8(i) of the said
act shall be made in writing to the commissioner by the parties in interest. The
application shall set forth fully all facts necessary to disclose the status of the
case and the reason for seeking approval of an agreed settlement under said
section, as well as the specific terms of such agreed settlement, and shall be
accompanied by a report of examination of the employee, if a recent report is not
of record in the office of the deputy commissioner. Such application, including
all supporting papers, shall be submitted in duplicate.
47. 20 C.F.R. § 31.26(c) (1972) states:
If the case is one coming within the purview of section 8(c) (21) or section 8(e)
of said act, and the deputy commissioner should determine that the proposed
agreed settlement according to such application is for the best interests of the
injured employee, the deputy commissioner shall transmit to the Bureau a copy of
the proposed agreed settlement, together with a statement of his recommendation
to such effect. The deputy commissioner shall transmit to the Bureau his com-
plete file in the case. All papers shall be sent by registered mail.
48. Both courts in Strachan rejected the argument, however, that barring the
1970 award would constitute a violation of these prohibitions on waiver and settlement.
49. 85 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1936).
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of a settlement of a claim. The court there rejected this argument on
the basis of the section 15(b) prohibition on waiver, stating that "this
section prevents any private settlement of a claim between the em-
ployer and employee." '50
It would seem, in the light of the Locke and Lowe cases, the
nature of the pre-hearing conference, long standing agency policy and
the prohibitions within the Act itself against waiver, that the claim in
Strachan would remain pending until the 1970 hearing. This, how-
ever, is not how the court viewed the situation. In the opinion of the
district court, "[i]t is unreasonable that the operation of this provision
should be indefinitely suspended by the mere filing of a claim."'" Such,
however, has been the policy of the past, as is illustrated by the Lowe
and Candado cases. In response to the argument that the order in
question was merely the adjudication of the original claim the dis-
trict court replied that "[h]owever it is labeled, what the Commissioner
did in 1970 was the functional equivalent of a modification, and is
therefore subject to the strictures of section 922. " 2 Such reasoning
would lead to the conclusion that although an order is in fact merely
the delayed adjudication of a claim as required by the Act, if because
some voluntary payments have been made in the interim the order
happens to modify those voluntary payments, then this award is pro-
hibited because it is the "functional equivalent" of something else, that
is, a modification. In other words, the reasoning is that although strictly
speaking such an order is permissible, and in fact required, it is barred
because it accomplishes the same result as something that is barred.
The court, nonetheless, applied section 22 and went on to hold that the
compensation order issued in this case was barred by that part of sec-
tion 22 precluding modification of an award not made within one year
of the "last payment."
III.
Even if the premise that section 22 applies is accepted, it still
must be determined whether or not the voluntary payment of Sep-
tember 1957 was a "last payment" within the meaning of that section.
Both the district court and the court of appeals decisions in Strachan
in finding that it was, stressed the self-executing nature of the Act. To
support this principle the district court cited section 14(a)"3 and a
50. Id. at 628.
51. 323 F. Supp. at 1122, 1125.
52. Id. at 1125.
53. 33 U.S.C. § 914(a) (1970) states: "Compensation under this chapter shall
be paid periodically, promptly, and directly to the person entitled thereto, without an
award, except where liability to pay compensation is controverted by the employer."
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portion of Flowers v. Travelers Insurance Co. 4  In determining
whether state or federal compensation laws should apply, the Fifth
Circuit in Flowers had noted:
Unlike some State compensation acts, the Longshoremen's Act is
almost self-executing. Compensation benefits are payable and paid,
medical care and attention furnished, generally without even the
necessity of filing a formal claim, as such, almost universally
without a formal hearing by the Deputy Commissioner, only in
a few cases does the matter proceed to formal hearing and award
and even more rare is the resort to the limited judicial review. 55
The Strachan court failed to note, however, that this statement was
made only to point out the necessity for compliance with pre-claim pro-
cedural provisions. Those in question concerned the filing by em-
ployers of reports of injuries in order to fulfill the self-executing nature
of the Act. Flowers does indicate, as does section 14(a), that com-
pensation under the Act ideally would be voluntary and in most cases
is. If voluntariness were the sole rule, however, those sections pertain-
ing to the filing, adjudication and review of claims would be unneces-
sary. The voluntary stage in Strachan was passed when the insurer
stopped the original voluntary payments of compensation and the claim
was filed. Upon the filing of the claim the procedures of section 19
should have then become effective, providing that if no hearing is
ordered on the claim the Deputy Commissioner, "shall, by order, re-
ject the claim or make an award in respect of the claim." 6 The district
court in Strachan stated that "[u] nless it is compelled by clear author-
ity, the limitations provisions of the statute should not be placed at
war with its self-executing nature."5 7 On the other hand, neither the
limitations provision nor the self-executing nature of the Act should
be placed at war with the rightful expectation of an employee to a full
adjudication by the Deputy Commissioner of a timely filed claim as
provided by section 19.
The district court also gave great weight to Ocean Accident &
Guarantee Corp. v. Lawson,58 where the section 22 limitation was held
54. 258 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 920 (1959). The claimant
was injured while making repairs on a floating drydock. The court of appeals held
that he was upon navigable waters and was engaged in a maritime employment and
was therefore within the exclusive coverage of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act and not the Texas Workers' Compensation Act.
55. 258 F.2d at 225.
56. 33 U.S.C. § 919 (1970).
57. 323 F. Supp. at 1125.
58. 135 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1943).
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to apply to voluntary payments. There the insurer of the employer
made voluntary payments to the injured employee and no claim was
ever filed. The Deputy Commissioner, on his own, ordered a hearing
three years after the last of these voluntary payments. The meaning of
"last payment" was at issue in the case because section 13 prohibited the
filing of a claim where a year had passed since the last voluntary
payment.
In the opinion of the district court in Strachan the fact that no
claim was filed in Lawson while one was filed in Strachan was a "dif-
ference rather than a distinction."5 9 The opinion in Lawson, however,
stressed very strongly the fact that no claim had been filed. The issue
to which the court specifically addressed itself was "whether or not
under Sections 914 and 922, Title 33, U.S.C.A., the Commissioner
had the right to proceed with the claim, notwithstanding the fact that
the claimant had failed to file a claim within one year as required by
Section 913 of said Act."'0°
Without a claim having been filed in Lawson the Deputy Com-
missioner granted a compensation order more than a year after the
cessation of voluntary payments. He justified the order on the basis
of section 14(h) 6 of the Act, which allows the Deputy Commissioner
in any case where payment is being made without an award, or where
compensation payments have stopped, to take such action as is neces-
sary to protect the rights of all parties. The court held that the
Deputy Commissioner's action was invalid since the claimant had failed
to file a claim and therefore had no rights to protect. If this is a dif-
ference rather than a distinction, it is a very large difference indeed.
Whether or not voluntary payments made after the filing of a
claim trigger the section 22 limitation where the claim itself is never
formally adjudicated depends primarily on the interpretation of the
clause "whether or not a compensation order has been issued."6 " The
court in Strachan interpreted it to mean any payment of compensation,
59. 323 F. Supp. at 1125.
60. 135 F.2d at 866.
61. 33 U.S.C. § 914(h) (1970) states:
The deputy commissioner (1) may upon his own initiative at any time in a case
in which payments are being made without an award, and (2) shall in any case
where right to compensation is controverted, or where payments of compensation
have been stopped or suspended, upon receipt of notice from any person entitled to
compensation, or from the employer, that the right to compensation is contro-
verted, or that payments of compensation have been stopped or suspended, make
such investigations, cause such medical examinations to be made, or hold such
hearings, and take such further action as he considers will properly protect the
rights of all parties.
62. See note 9 supra.
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whether strictly voluntary payments (where no claim has ever been
filed), voluntary payments made after the filing of a claim but with-
out formal or informal adjudication, or payments pursuant to a formal
compensation order. Such an interpretation, while seemingly valid
if one looks solely at the bare words of the section, ceases to be con-
vincing when considered in the light of past agency interpretation of
this provision itself and the previously discussed interpretation of
related sections by the courts. It would be more reasonable, in light
of the detailed procedures outlined in section 19 for handling claims,63
section 14(h), 4 and the reasoning in Lawson'5 to interpret the clause
as being intended to cover, in addition to cases where formal compen-
sation orders are issued, only those cases where the payments were
strictly voluntary and no claim was ever filed. This is not to say, as
does the dissent in Strachan,"6 that section 22 applies only to cases
where a final determination has been made by the Deputy Commis-
sioner - to do so would be to thwart the ideal of voluntariness.
Rather, it is meant that section 22 applies: first, where no claim was
filed and voluntary payments were made; and second, where a claim
was filed and a compensation order issued. Such an interpretation
would not "delete the limitation provisions from the statute" as feared
by the district court in Strachan, and would encourage the deputy com-
missioner to terminate cases in compliance with section 19 of the Act.
If the Strachan court's interpretation of the Act prevails, a reluctant
insurer could make as few as one voluntary payment after a claim is
filed and the section 22 period of limitations would begin to run. The
employee would then have to file a new claim, one more voluntary pay-
ment could be made and the employee would have to start all over
again. Such an interpretation would allow for stalling at best and
harassment at worst. The narrower interpretation proposed here
would be compatible with the ideal of voluntariness in cases where the
injured employee is satisfied with the voluntary payments and there-
fore need never file a claim unless those payments are stopped or, due
to a change in circumstance, become inadequate. It would also pro-
vide for certainty by limiting the time period during which a claimant
who has had full adjudication of his claim could obtain modification
of the award. At the same time an employee who has filed a timely
claim will not be cut off from relief in the form of compensation if he
accepts some voluntary payments before final adjudication of his claim.
63. See note 18 supra.
64. See note 61 supra.
65. 135 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1943).
66. 460 F2d at 1116 (Ainsworth, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
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CONCLUSION
Strachan presents the initial judicial attempt to interpret this
vague clause of the Act and to apply it to a fact situation not specifically
provided for. While the clause in question is outstanding in its am-
biguity, the court could have given a reasonable and just interpreta-
tion that would have been in keeping with other portions of the Act
and which would have avoided the fear expressed by the Office of
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation that the inter-
pretation chosen would ". . . destroy the existing interlocutory claim
procedures by which all but a few claims are amicably disposed of
without either informal or formal adjudication. '0 7
67. Letter from John E. Stocker, Assistant Director, Office of Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation to Leavenworth Colby, Special Assistant to the
Attorney General, as quoted in 460 F.2d at 1119.
